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Abstract
We study a mixed population of adaptive agents with small and large mem-
ories, competing in a minority game. If the agents are sufficiently adaptive,
we find that the average winnings per agent can exceed that obtainable in
the corresponding pure populations. In contrast to the pure population, the
average success rate of the large-memory agents can be greater than 50 per-
cent. The present results are not reproduced if the agents are fed a random
history, thereby demonstrating the importance of memory in this system.
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The subject of emergent phenomena in complex adaptive systems is attracting much
interest among workers in physics, economics, biological and social sciences [1]. The minority
game, introduced by Challet and Zhang [2] and studied subsequently by various workers
[3–7], represents a fascinating toy-model of a dynamical, complex adaptive system where
members of the population (agents) repeatedly compete to be in a minority. It offers,
for example, a simple paradigm for the decision dynamics underlying financial markets:
more buyers than sellers implies higher prices, hence it can be better for a trader to be
in the minority group of sellers. Subsequent to Challet and Zhang’s pioneering work [2],
studies of the minority game have focused on a ‘pure’ population where all agents have
the same memory, or brain-size, m. A particularly interesting observation by Savit [3] is
that while correlations can arise in the resulting (endogenous) history time-series for the
pure population, these correlations cannot be further exploited for profit by the agents
themselves.
In this paper, we explore the performance of a mixed-ability population where individual
agents have either a small or large memory. If the agents are sufficiently adaptive, we find
that the average winnings per agent can exceed that obtainable in the corresponding pure
populations, achieving a maximum at a non-zero mixing ratio. In contrast to the pure pop-
ulation, the average success rate of the large-memory agents can exceed 50%. These results,
however, are not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history, thereby demonstrating
the importance of the true history (and hence memory) in this system.
The minority game [2–7] takes the form of a repeated game with an odd number of agents
N who must choose independently whether to be in room ‘0’ or room ‘1’. The winners are
those in the room with fewer agents. The ‘output’ is a single binary digit, 0 or 1, representing
the winning room for each time step. This output is made available to all agents, and is the
only information they can use to make decisions in subsequent turns. The memory m is the
length of the recent history bit-string that an agent can use when making its next decision
[2–5,7]. We consider a population containing nm agents with memory m, and nm′ = N −nm
agents with memory m′. Consider m = 3; there are 22
m
= 256 possible strategies, each of
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which can be represented by a string of 8 bits (0 or 1) corresponding to the decisions based
on the 23 = 8 possible histories 000, 001 etc. . The agents randomly pick s strategies at
the beginning of the game, with repetitions allowed. After each turn, the agent assigns one
(virtual) point to each of his strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome.
In addition the agent gets awarded one (real) point if he is successful. At each turn of the
game, the agent uses the most successful strategy (i.e. most virtual points) from his bag of
s strategies. The success of any particular strategy is generally short-lived. If all the agents
begin to use similar strategies, such a strategy ceases to be profitable and is dropped. Hence
there is no best strategy for all times.
There are two ‘spaces’ of interest in the minority game, both of which depend on m:
(a) Strategy space. This forms a 2m-dimensional hypercube for memory m with strategies at
the 22
m
vertices [2]. If the size of the strategy space is small compared to the total number
of agents N (i.e. 2.2m << Ns [2–4]) many agents may hold the highest-scoring strategy at
any given turn and hence make the same decision. This leads to a large standard deviation
in the winning room and hence a relatively low number of total points awarded [2–5,7].
Such crowd-effects are a strategy-space phenomenon and have been shown to quantitatively
explain the fluctuations for the pure population as a function of m and s [4]. Consider the
average points per agent per turn W , defined as the total number of points awarded in that
turn divided by the total number of agents. For small m, W is substantially less than 0.5
due to the crowd-effects mentioned above. The maximum possible W would correspond to
the winning-room attendance permanently staying at (N −1)/2. Therefore W is always less
than or equal to (N−1)/2N , hence W < 0.5. Note that an external (i.e. non-participating)
gambler using a coin-toss to predict the winning room, would have a 50% success rate since
he would not suffer from this intrinsic crowding in strategy-space.
(b) History space. This forms an m-dimensional hypercube whose 2m vertices correspond
to all possible recent history bit-strings of length m (000, 001 etc. for m = 3). For a pure
population of agents with memory m, where 2.2m << Ns, there is information left in the
history time-series [3]: however this information is hidden in bit-strings of length greater
3
than m and hence is not accessible to the agents [3]. For large m, there is information left
in bit-strings of any length: however the agents have insufficient strategies to further exploit
this information [3]. Cavagna has shown [6] that the standard deviation of the attendance
of a given room (e.g. room 0) is changed little if the real history is replaced by a random
one at each turn of the game: this follows from the fact that the agents cannot exploit any
remaining correlations in the real history time-series.
Figure 1 shows the average winnings per agent per turn W for a mixed population of
N = 101 players, with memory m = 3 or m′ = 6, obtained using numerical simulations.
The number of m = 3 agents n3 is shown on the x-axis, hence the number of m
′ = 6 agents
is given by n6 = 101 − n3. Each agent has s = 7 strategies. The parameters are chosen
so that the pure populations lie in the crowded, or frustrated, regime (i.e. 2.2m << Ns)
since we are interested in investigating whether our mixed population can adapt to relieve
this frustration. Each data-point corresponds to an average over 32 runs, with data being
collected in the limit of long times. For clarity the spread in values at each data-point is not
shown; these spreads are sufficiently small for us to be certain that the features we discuss
here are not numerical artifacts. For the ‘real history’ results, the m = 3 (m′ = 6) agents are
supplied with the last 3 (6) bits of the winning-room time-series. For the ‘random history’
results, a random 6-bit string is generated at every turn of the game and given to the m′ = 6
agents; the m = 3 agents are only given the last 3 digits of this string. A striking result of
Fig. 1 is that the average number of points per agent W (solid circles) shows a maximum
at finite mixing, i.e. at n3 ∼ 35, n6 ∼ 65. The total number of points awarded per turn can
therefore exceed that corresponding to either pure m = 3 or pure m′ = 6 populations. This
result is not reproduced if the history supplied to the agents is random (open circles).
Figure 2 shows the average winnings per turn for them = 3 andm′ = 6 agents separately.
The straight line at 0.5 corresponds to the average success-rate for a non-participating agent
predicting winning rooms using a coin-toss; as discussed above, it is also the upper limit
for the average winnings per agent in a pure population. For n3 > 45, the average m
′ = 6
agent (solid triangles) manages to beat the coin-toss agent and systematically profit from
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the game (see also Ref. [2]). This cannot occur in the minority game with pure populations,
regardless of the memory m. Although certain agents in the pure population may manage to
beat the coin-toss if the strategy space is sufficiently large, the average winnings per agent
is still less than 0.5. It is surprising that this systematic profiteering by m′ = 6 agents in the
mixed population can occur up to relatively large values of n6, i.e. in populations of up to
∼ 55% m′ = 6 players. Although the random-history result reproduces the m = 3 agents’
winnings fairly well (open squares), it is quite inaccurate for the m′ = 6 agents: specifically,
the m′ = 6 players in the random-history game (open triangles) always do worse than the
coin-toss. This is essentially because the m′ = 6 agents in the real-history game have the
opportunity to exploit correlations in the real-history time-series left by the m = 3 agents.
The enhanced average winnings for m′ = 6 agents in Fig. 2, together with the corresponding
peak in Fig. 1, result from the subtle interplay of history-space and strategy-space effects
and demonstrate the importance of the memory in this system.
Figure 2 shows that as n3 → 1, and hence n6 → N − 1, the remaining m = 3 agents
manage to increase their average winnings. In fact a single m = 3 agent in an m′ = 6
population wins the same amount as the average m′ = 6 agent. This surprising result
can be understood by realizing that for n6 → N , the m
′ = 6 population is in the ‘crowd’
region [2–4], hence the m′ = 6 agents win a relatively low number of points on average. For
n3 > 60, the average winnings per m = 3 agent saturates at the value corresponding to
a pure m = 3 population, despite the fact that the m′ = 6 agents are still systematically
profiting from the game. In this sense, our competitive agents are also demonstrating some
degree of (unintentional) mutual cooperation.
As the number of strategies per agent s decreases, for fixed m = 3 and m′ = 6, the peak
in Fig. 1 becomes less pronounced. For s = 2, there is no discernible peak. This suggests
that the benefits of a mixed population, in terms of maximizing the total number of points
awarded, may require a certain level of adaptivity. Even at s = 2, however, the average
winnings of the large-memory m′ = 6 agents is still greater than 0.5 in the limit of small
n6. Note that the main results presented here do not vary significantly if N is increased.
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Detailed results as a function of m, m′, s and N will be presented elsewhere.
We now discuss the reasons why the real and random histories might produce different
results. Consider the 26 = 64 possible histories for m′ = 6. Suppose the system has reached
...001010 at time t. The subsequent evolution on the 6-dimensional history-space hypercube
allows a number of possible trajectories starting at the vertex 001010. For example, at time
t + 1 the system can be at 010100 or 010101; however it cannot be at any other of the 64
possible vertices. We therefore see that them′ = 6 agents pass through the history-space, and
hence update their strategies, by moving on a particular subset of all possible trajectories.
In contrast, the random-history model allows the system to jump to any history-space vertex
with equal probability at a given time-step. If the game only contains a pure population,
the agents cannot access any additional correlations in the real-history time-series [3]: it
therefore matters little if the system visits all history-space vertices in a deterministic or
random way. The random-history and real-history results are therefore similar for pure
populations (see Fig. 1 and Ref. [6]). However when the two sets of agents coexist, there are
two separate time-scales for passing through the respective history-spaces, i.e. τ6 > 2
6 = 64
for m′ = 6 agents and τ3 > 2
3 = 8 for m = 3 agents. The time-scale τ3 for m = 3
agents will be relatively short, hence random-history and real-history models should provide
similar results for m = 3 agents, as demonstrated in Fig. 2. On this τ3 time-scale, however,
the m′ = 6 real-history agents are dynamically updating their strategies in a qualitatively
different way from the m′ = 6 random-history agents, because of this distinction between
real-history and random-history trajectories. The m′ = 6 real-history agents now have the
opportunity to exploit specific correlations in the real-history time-series left by the m = 3
agents.
Fluctuations in the winning room attendance away from (N −1)/2 = 50 imply wasteage
of total points [2]. Hence W ∼ 0.5− σ
N
, where σ is the standard deviation of the attendance
in one of the rooms, say room 0. For a pure population in the crowded regime, σ ∝ N : hence
we write σ ∼ CN where C is a constant of proportionality (see Ref. [4] for a more detailed
analytic analysis). This expression includes the crowd-effect in strategy-space involving
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agents with equal memory [4]. For the mixed population, we assume that the corresponding
σ is obtained by adding separately the contributions to the variance from the m = 3 agents
and the m′ = 6 agents; defining the concentration of m = 3 agents as x = n3
N
, then
σ2 ∼ σ2
3
+ σ2
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where σ3 ∼ C3xN and σ6 ∼ C6(1 − x)N . This latter assumption of additive
variances assumes that the system has managed to remove any internal frustration between
agents with different memories, i.e. the two groups of agents behave independently. This is
not unreasonable given the interplay between history and strategy-spaces in the real-history
model. Hence in the mixed population W ∼ 0.5 − [C2
3
x2 + C2
6
(1 − x)2]1/2. For x → 0 we
obtain a straight line W ∼ 0.5− C6 + C6x with positive slope (consistent with real-history
results in Fig. 1), while for x → 1 we obtain a straight line W ∼ 0.5 − C3x with negative
slope (again consistent with Fig. 1). This theoretical curve does exhibit a maximum at
x ∼ 0.18, W ∼ 0.428. Intriguingly, however, it tends to underestimate the real-history
winnings suggesting that the actual population is exhibiting an additional degree of co-
operation (correlation). A fuller theory of this mixed system is therefore needed which will
incorporate such additional inter-agent correlations.
In summary, we have studied the performance of a binary population containing agents
with dissimilar memories. Both the strategy-space (‘configurational’) and history-space
(‘temporal’) correlations play a crucial role in the system’s evolution. The importance of
memory has been demonstrated. The present results may contribute to a better under-
standing of optimization in generic multi-agent systems where resources are limited, e.g.
social dilemmas and Internet congestion [8–10]. Assuming that the present system provides
a simple model of a marketplace, our results suggest that a surprisingly large number of
‘superior’ (m′ = 6) traders can consistently ‘beat the market’ by uncovering and exploiting
hidden correlations in the system’s recent history without being directly detrimental to the
remainder: needless to say that the usefulness of such technical analysis, or ‘charting’, is
still a hotly debated issue in the financial world.
We thank A. Short for additional computer simulations, and D. Challet, D. Leonard, D.
Sherrington and A. Cavagna for discussions regarding the pure-population minority game.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Average winnings per agent per turnW for a mixed population of N = 101 players,
with memory m = 3 or m′ = 6, obtained numerically. Each agent has s = 7 strategies. Each
data-point corresponds to an average over 32 runs. See text for an explanation of ‘real
history’ and ‘random history’.
Figure 2: Average winnings per turn for m = 3 and m′ = 6 agents separately. Other
parameters are as in Figure 1. See text for an explanation of ‘coin-toss’.
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